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ALL THINGS NOT BEING EQUAL: THE CASE FOR RACE
SEPARATE SCHOOLS
I. INTRODUCTION
Children in Detroit walk by crack houses every morning on
their way to Woodward Elementary School where a janitor was
killed in a drive-by shooting in 1990.1 Ninety percent of the chil-
dren attending Detroit's public schools are African-American. 2
Thirty years of deterioration have rendered useless the science labs
at East St. Louis High School, prompting one teacher to remark
that "[lt would be great if we had water."3 Ninety-eight percent
of the population of East St. Louis is African-American. The
Milwaukee school board reports that eighty percent of its African-
American male high school students' grades average below a "C".'
While only twenty-five percent of the Milwaukee public school
student population is African-American, fifty percent of the stu-
dents suspended annually belong to this group.6
A. The Problem
The benefits of school desegregation are illusory to many
1. Isabel Wilkerson, Detroit's Boys-Only Schools Facing Bias Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 1991, at Al, A17.
2. Id.
3. JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 27
(1991) [hereinafter SAVAGE INEQUALTIE]. Between 1988 and 1990, Kozol traveled across
the country, visiting schools and speaking to children in approximately 30 different
neighborhoods. SAVAGE INEQUALITIES chronicles this journey. Kozol reports that -[w]hat
startled [him] most ... was the remarkable degree of racial segregation that persisted
almost everywhere." Id. at 2.,
4. Id. at 7.
5. lean Merl and Eric Harrison, Schools Reach Out to Blacks, LA. TIMES, Dec. 28,
1990, at Al.
6. Id
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African-American children in the United States. Nationally, the
high school dropout rate of African-Americans is twice that of
white school children.7 The abysmal statistics reflect the harsh
reality that many African-American children are relegated to life at
the bottom of the socioeconomic scale. By all economic and social
measures, African-Americans are significantly worse off than their
white counterparts.' Poverty rates for African-Americans are cur-
rently two to three times higher than the rates for whites.9 In addi-
tion, African-American unemployment rates are consistently double
those of white individuals.10 The life expectancies of African-
American men and women are appreciably less than those of white
men and women.' Half of all prison inmates are African-
Americans, which is proportionately four times greater than their
numbers in the overall population.1 2 They are also more likely to
be the victims of crime than their proportion in the general popula-
tion would indicate. 3 African-Americans are six to seven times
7. A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKs AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 20 (Gerald D. Jaynes and
Robin M. Williams, Jr. eds. 1989) [hereinafter A COMMON DESTINY].
8. For example, the median income of an African-American family is 57 percent that
of a white family. In 1987, the median income for an African-American family was
$18,098 annually, as compared to $32,274 for a white family. THE NEGRO ALMANAC: A
REFERENCE WORK ON THE AFRICAN AMERICAN 482 (Harry A. Ploski and James Williams
eds., 5th ed. 1989) [hereinafter THE NEGRO ALMANAC]. In 1984, the median net worth of
a white household based on the value of its holdings was $39,135, as compared to $3397
for an African-American household. Therefore, for every dollar of wealth in the white
household, the African-American household had nine cents. A COMMON DESTINY, supra
note 7, at 292.
9. In 1987, 10.5% of the white population was living below the poverty line, while
33.1% of this country's African-American population was similarly situated. THE NEGRO
ALMANAC, supra note 8, at 503.
10. During the recession of 1981-82, the national unemployment rate peaked at 9.7%,
while African-Americans were unemployed at a rate of 18.9%, which eventually rose to
19.5% in 1983. Id. at 605-06. In May 1988, the unemployment rate for African-Amer-
icans was recorded at an all-time low of 10.8%, but that figure was still double the rate
for whites. Id. at 606. In the fall of 1988, a rise in the national unemployment rate to
'5.6% was paralleled by an increase in the African-American unemployment rate to 11.3%.
Id.
11. In 1985, the average life expectancy for a white person was 75.3 years, as com-
pared to 71.2 years for an African-American. A white woman can expect to live for 78.7
years, as compared to 75.2 years for an African-American woman. An African-American
man's life expectancy is 67.2 years, while a white man's is 71.8 years. Id. at 545.
12. The prison population in federal and state institutions in 1985 was comprised of
260,847 white inmates and 227,137 African-American inmates. Id. at 546.
13. Annual statistics compiled by the Department of Justice reveal that for the crimes
of robbery, assault, burglary and household larceny, the victimization rates by race or
ethnic group were: 234,000 whites; 324,000 African-Americans; 289,000 Hispanics; and
223,000 others. A COMMON DESTINY, supra note 7, at 464-65.
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more likely to be the victims of murder, which is the leading cause
of death among young African-American men14
Unfortunately, the situation has not improved much, if at all,
in twenty-five years. The findings of the National Advisory Com-
mission on Civil Disorders' 5 were equally devastating when pub-
lished in 1968. In 1966, the median income for an African-Ameri-
can family was fifty-eight percent of the white family's median
income, 6 and 1967 unemployment rates of African-American
males were more than twice those of white men.' 7 Crime rates
were 4.9 times higher in the very low-income, African-American
districts of Chicago than in the high-income white districts.'8 Life
expectancies of African-Americans were significantly lower than
those of whites. 9 The Commission concluded that the factors of
racial segregation and economic isolation coalesced to create a de-
structive environment within the ghettoized inner city,20 where
sixty-nine percent of the country's African-American population
lived in 1967.21 The Commission recommended a plan of integra-
tion combined with various enrichment programs.2 In particular,
the Commission advocated educational programs designed to en-
courage self-development and to overcome both feelings of
powerlessness and a lack of self-respect.'
B." A Solution
Recently, educators have become ingenious in their efforts to
deal with the plight of the African-American child. Several Chicago
14. Id. at 498.
15. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders was established by President
Johnson on July 28, 1967, in the aftermath of two weeks of racial disorders 'in cities
across the country. The Commission was convened to answer three questions: -What hap-
pened? Why did it happen? What can be done to prevent it from happening again?" NA-
TIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON Civa. DISORDERS, 1968 REPORT 1 (1968).
16. Id. at 123.
17. In 1967, the unemployment rate for white persons was 3.4%, while 8.2% of the
non-white labor force were unemployed. Id. at 124.
18. For example, in Chicago in 1965, 1038 property crimes were committed in a high-
income white district, as compared to 2630 similar crimes in a very low-income, African-
American district. Id. at 134.
19. At age 25, an 11% difference in life span existed; whites will live an average of
48.6 more years, while African-Americans will live an additional 43.3 years. Id. at 136-
37.
20. Id. at 1.
21. Id. at 115.
22. The Commission proposed increased federal spending for education, housing, em-
ployment, job training and social services. Id. at 218-19.
23. Id. at 222-23.
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public schools have established Afrocentric curriculums which teach
African history and include special classes designed to instill self-
esteem.24 In Los Angeles, a mentoring group called "100 Black
Men" offers individual attention and encouragement as well as
scholarship assistance for college to students in grades eight
through twelve.' The most controversial programs, however, are
the African-American Immersion Schools, the single race male
academies which have been proposed by the Detroit and Milwau-
kee school boards.26 The academies provide cultural role models
and typically include an Afrocentric curriculum, mentoring pro-
grams, strict discipline, and academic instruction that is tailored to
the cultural learning biases of the students. Extra classes, tutoring
and mandatory extracurricular activities complete the program.21
This note supports the adoption of the African-American Im-
mersion School on a trial basis. There are a variety of factors
which contribute to the current state of urban education; poverty
and dysfunctional family 'structures loom large among them.28 The
African-American Immersion School cannot and does not attempt
to solve all the systemic problems faced by those living within the
inner cities. Rather, the Immersion School addresses the specific
problem of educational inequality. It is designed to provide aca-
demic and psychological preparation so that its students will be-
come self-sustaining and contributing members of society. A better
educated population will have a positive effect on social problems
such as welfare dependency, the crime rate, drug abuse and teenage
pregnancy.
The African-American Immersion School discussed in this
note, while race-exclusive, is coeducational. The problems faced by
African-Americans are not gender specific; therefore, it is inappro-
priate for the solution to exclude females.29 This note's model
24. Merl and Harrison, supra note 5, at Al.
25. Id.
26. James Traub, Ghetto Blasters: The Case for All-Black Schools, THE NEW REPUB-
UC, Apr. 15, 1991, at 21.
27. See id.; Laurel S. Walters, The Plight of Black Male Schools, THE CHRISTIAN Sa.
MONITOR, Sept. 9, 1991, at 8; Wilkerson, supra note 1, at Al.
28. See SAVAGE INEQUALITIES, supra note 3, at 123 (acknowledging that while govern-
rnent is not responsible for creating or curing all social ills, it has undertaken responsibili-
ty for public education and fiscal equality will result in dramatic changes).
29. High school dropout rates are not appreciably different for African-American girls
and boys. Recently, 44.6% of New Orleans* dropouts were African-American males, as
compared to 41.2% who were African-American females. Jacqueline Berrien, A Civil Lib-
erties Must: High Quality Education for All Black Children, CIV. LIBERTIES, Fall, 1991, at
[V/ol. 43:593
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African-American Immersion School is open equally to African-
American boys and girls on a voluntary admission basis. Up to
half of the classes may be gender-exclusive as long as no child is
foreclosed from taking any particular class.
Discipline will be strict, patterned on what has been consid-
ered the norm in parochial schools. Children will wear uniforms
and be expected to meet certain behavioral standards. The school
day will be extended to allow time for academic tutoring as well
as mandatory participation in extracurricular and cocurricular activi-
ties. Both African and African-American culture and history will be
emphasized to instill in each child pride in her or his culture. All
of the school's teachers and administrators will be African-Ameri-
can in order to provide the children with positive cultural role
models. A mentoring program in which each child will be assigned
to work with an individual from the community completes the
academic experience.
The goals of the African-American Immersion School are two-
fold. The first aim is to provide each child with an adequate edu-
cation to enable him or her to make informed decisions and partic-
ipate in the political process. The second aim is to develop in each
child a sense of self-worth to enable him or her to become a self-
sustaining. member of society. The overriding concern is to prepare
African-Americans to compete in a society that is currently domi-
nated by institutions controlled by the white population.
Critics complain that establishment of the African-American
Immersion School will undermine efforts to eliminate segrega-
tion."0 They also argue that the school will further isolate African-
American children from mainstream society.1 This note does not
7. In Detroit, 55% of the boys and 45% of the girls in urban schools drop out. Helen R.
Neubome, Girls Are Drowning, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1991, at A23. In response to
the recent constitutional challenge to the Detroit all-male school, a district court judge
ordered that girls be admitted also. The court found that "[t]here is no evidence that the
educational system is failing urban males because females attend schools with males. In
fact, the educational system is also failing females." Garrett v. Board of Educ. of the Sch.
Dist. of Detroit, 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1008 (E.D. Mich. 1991). See also Kimberle
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique
of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CH. LE-
GAL F. 139, 140 (arguing that the concerns of African-American women are often neglect-
ed and theoretically erased from the political dialogue since these women's experiences
result from the unique intersection of race and gender and, consequently, cannot be found
in either feminist theory or anti-racist discourse).
30. See Merl and Harrison, supra note 5, at Al (quoting Milwaukee NAACP President
Chaney's comment, "I'm against all segregation - I don't care what kind it is.").
31. See Walters, supra note 27, at 8 (explaining that some believe that the concept of
1993]
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challenge the theoretical model of integration. The African-Ameri-
can Immersion School is designed to supplement, not supplant,
desegregation efforts. The school has particular value in those
geographic areas where it is impossible to achieve integration be-
cause of segregated housing patterns.
Part II of this note argues that educational reform efforts must
focus on the quality of education, and that racial separation may be
appropriate in the pursuit of quality education. The African-Ameri-
can Immersion School, although segregated, will promote societal
integration in the long-run by better educating children to be con-
tributing members of society. Part m reviews the Supreme Court's
desegregation decisions beginning with Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion32 and concludes that the Afiican-American Immersion School
does not undermine the goals of integration. This conclusion holds
true despite the African-American Immersion School's susceptibility
to a constitutional equal protection challenge stemming from the
use of race-conscious selection criteria. Part IV argues that an
intermediate standard of scrutiny is the correct test to apply to an
equal protection challenge in the educational realm. Part V argues
that, even if strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review,
the African-American Immersion School passes constitutional mus-
ter. This note concludes that the African-American Immersion
School, as an experimental educational program, is constitutionally
sound.
II. QUALITy EDUCATION AND RACIAL SEPARATION ARE NOT
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE
A. Education is the Primary Goal
Historically, educational deprivation has been linked to the
political oppression and social subjugation of African-Americans. 33
As early as 1935, W.E.B. du Bois' argued that "the Negro needs
the African-American male school is a retrogression for African-Americans, who in the
long run must live in a heterogeneous society).
32. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown 1].
33. Denise C. Morgan, What Is Left to Argue in Desegregation Law?: The Right to
Minimally Adequate Education, 8 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 99, 101-03 (1991) (beginning
with the anti-literacy laws of the slavery era and continuing beyond the segregated South-
em schools of the mid-twentieth century, African-Americans have been effectively deprived
of the opportunity to influence social and political change in a way that educated people
who are aware of their rights have not).
34. Du Bois (1868-1963) was a civil rights advocate and one of the founding members
[Vol. 43:593
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neither segregated schools nor mixed schools. What he needs is
Education." 35 Du Bois believed that education was essential to
prepare African-Americans to live and compete in white society. 6
Educational equity may be viewed as a way to achieve overall
societal integration. The theoretical model of integration espoused
by Brown I is very attractive.r Integration has not failed; on the
contrary, it has yielded positive results where properly implement-
ed. 31 Unfortunately, often because of residential segregation, inte-
gration is not a reality for many African-American school chil-
dren. 39
The phenomenon of resegregation within desegregated schools
has also hampered integration efforts.4° Even in those school sys-
tems in which statistical integration has been achieved, internal
tracking programs often segregate African-American children within
of the NAACP. He is acknowledged to be one of the premier American scholars on
racial issues. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Legacy of W.E.B. du Bois: A National Model
for Achieving Public School Equity for America's Black Children, 11 CREIGHTON L. REV.
409, 414-19 (1977) (focusing on du Bois' life and his theories of educational equity).
35. W.E.B. du Bois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, 4 J. OF NEGRO EDUC.
328, 335 (1935). Twenty years prior to the desegregation mandate of Brown I, du Bois
asserted that there was a difference between being admitted and being welcomed into an
institution. Id. at 329. He believed that a "finer, better balance of spirit" would be
.achieved by educating children in schools- where they are wanted and happy and are,
therefore, more likely to be inspired. Id. at 331.
36. Id. at 333 (asserting that "until American Negroes believe in their own power and
ability, they are going to be helpless before the white world").
37. Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) ("To separate [African-American children] from
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a
way unlikely ever to be undone.").
38. Research reveals gains on standardized achievement tests for African-American stu-
dents attending desegregated schools, while the achievement of white students is unaffect-
ed. A COMMON DESTINY, supra note 7, at 373-74.
39. The greatest strides in school desegregation were made between 1966 and 1973.
Further efforts have been stymied by shifts in residential housing patterns and court deci-
sions that have limited the acceptable remedial measures. In 1980, African-American chil-
dren comprised one-fifth of the public-school enrollment nationally, but almost two-thirds
of these children attended schools where more than one-half of the students were minori-
ties. Id. at 76. See also infra notes 70-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Supreme Court's desegregation decisions.
40. The most common resegregation practices include ability grouping, tracking of stu-
dents into separate academic programs, and uneven disciplinary practices that fall
disproportionately on minority students and, consequently, create racial imbalances within
the classrooms. Resegregation has sometimes been so pronounced as to be called "two
schools within a school." A COMMON DESTINY, supra note 7, at 82. Investigators study-
ing 10 school districts under court-ordered desegregation concluded that, while the school
districts were technically complying with desegregation orders, resegregation had occurred
within most of the schools. Id.
19931
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the classrooms.41 In the academic community, tracking has be-
come a euphemism for "sorting for success and failure."4 2 Chil-
dren in the upper tracks are prepared for college and ultimately
secure higher paying jobs, while those in lower academic groups
are more likely to be trained for the lesser paying vocational occu-
pations.43 As a result, African-American children receive negative
messages about their abilities and their potential, and these messag-
es undermine their scholastic achievement.44 These children may
be further disabled because they sometimes lack positive role mod-
els within their families and immediate communities.45 There is
no apparent reward for persevering in school.46
The time has come to ensure that every child in this country
receives an education which will allow him or her to become self-
sustaining and able both to make informed decisions and participate
in the political process. The emphasis must be on educational out-
comes. Positive outcomes may require the use of race-conscious
instruction in the first instance to overcome racial segregation.
B. Colorblind Principles Cannot Succeed in a Racist Society
A real estate agency in Brooklyn, New York, is firebombed
41. See SAVAGE INEQUALITIES, supra note 3, at 119 (findings of the Public Education
Association of New York reveal that "classes for the emotionally handicapped, neurologi-
cally impaired, learning disabled and educable mentally retarded are disproportionately
black").
42. Eva W. Chunn, Sorting Black Students for Success and Failure: The Inequity of
Ability Grouping and Tracking, in BLACK EDUCATION: A QUEST FOR EQUITY AND EXCEL-
LENCE, 93, 101 (Willy D. Smith and Eva W. Chunn eds., 1987). There is a positive
correlation between a child's race or socioeconomic status and the academic group into
which the child is placed. Id. at 100. Research indicates that the highest academic groups
are usually composed of students from the upper socioeconomic levels, while minority stu-
dents, generally African-American males, and students from poorer families make up the
lower-ability groups. Id. Race appears to weigh more heavily than socioeconomic status.
High-achieving African-American students can often be found in the lower academic
groups. Id. Conversely, lower-achieving but middle-class white students tend to be placed
in higher-ability groups. Id.
43. Id. at 101.
44. See SAVAGE INEQUALITIES, supra note 3, at 99 (stating that children in these situ-
ations seem to understand intuitively that they are poor investments and come to behave
as such).
45. See, e.g., Wilkerson, supra note 1, at Al (noting that young African-American
males from Detoit's inner-city schools have few positive African-American male role mod-
els).
46. See A COMMON DESTINY, supra note 7, at 371-72 (finding that minority children,
who are encouraged by their parents to do well and get a good education, often fail to
do so because their perceptions are colored by the underemployment and unemployment
which they see around them).
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because it shows homes in a predominately white neighborhood to
prospective African-American purchasers.47 A former member of
the Ku Klux Klan runs for governor of the State of Louisiana.48
The President. of the United States is aghast to learn that the State
of Mississippi continues to maintain a segregated state-funded
university system.49 Public schools in Austin, Texas, have adopted
as symbols of school spirit the Confederate Flag, the song of Dix-
ie, and team names of Rebels or Rebelettes.50 An African-Ameri-
can lawyer, searching for an apartment for his family in New
York, fills out an eligibility form and lists his annual income. The
real estate agent wants to know how many people in the family
work to make up the listed income. When the lawyer replies that
the listed figure is comprised of his own salary as an attorney, the
agent is noticeably embarrassed. She recognized that she automati-
cally, subconsciously questioned this man's income simply because
of the color of his skin.51
Principles of color blindness are only effective when society
operates on a racially neutral basis. Such is not the case in the
United States today. Despite the enactment of the Civil War
Amendments between 1865 and 1870,52 the repudiation of the
"separate but equal doctrine"53 in 1954, 54 and the enactment of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 55 our society continues to treat peo-
ple differently based on their race.56 The pervasive de facto segre-
47. Curtis Rist, More Canarsie Threats, NEWSDAY, Sept. 27, 1991, at 37 (reporting
that a real estate agency was firebombed for the third time in four months and that the
police have classified the bombings and threats to agents as racial bias incidents).
48. Ex Klan Leader in Louisiana to Enter Gubernatorial Race, CHIcAGo TRIBUNE,
Dec. 21, 1990, at 4, available in Lexis, Nexis Library Major Papers File (reporting that
David Duke, former Ku Klux Klan leader, would announce his intention to run as the
Republican Party candidate for governor of Louisiana).
49. Linda Greenhouse, Bush Reverses U.S. Stance Against Black College Aid, N.Y.
TMES, Oct. 22, 1991, at B6 (reporting that President Bush took the unusual step of or-
dering the Solicitor General to reverse his position in a pending Supreme Court case and
file an amended brief, arguing for the eradication of racial discrimination and the elim-
ination of current funding disparities among eight state universities in Mississippi).
50. Victor Goode, Cultural Racism in Public Education: A Legal Tactic for Black
Texans, 33 How. L.L 321, 321 (1990) (arguing that, because public schools transmit
normative cultural values, the Austin schools should be prohibited from adopting symbols
which are connected to and legitimize a history of racist oppression).
51. Retold with permission of john a. powell, Director, National Legal Department,
American Civil Liberties Union, New York, N.Y. (Aug. 1991).
52. U.S. CONST. amends. XII-XV.
53. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-52 (1896).
54. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1988), as amended by Civil Rights Act of 1991.
56. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
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gation in suburban residential areas and public school systems is
evidence of a racist society. Achievement of the American dream
remains outside the grasp of most African-Americans. 57 For exam-
ple, African-Americans are much less likely to attend college than
are white high school graduates. 58  The odds that the African-
American student, once enrolled, will graduate with a college de-
gree are about half those of the white student.59 Consequently,
African-Americans are underrepresented in the professions ' and
have diminished earning potentials. 61 Taken to its logical conclu-
sion, this means that African-Americans have less income to spend
on housing and consumer goods.
While most individuals no longer engage in intentional acts of
discrimination, as a society we collectively retain the vestiges of a
history of legally sanctioned racism.62 Because the overt signs of
1060, 1065-66 (1991) ("We live in a world of racial inequality. In almost every important
category, blacks as a group are worse off than whites."); Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race,
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1359 (1988) (arguing that African-Americans are effectively
precluded from influencing mainstream white society because of their "othemess").
57. See Crenshaw, supra note 56, at 1379 (arguing that while the demise of the Jim
Crow laws marked the end of legalized white supremacy, the white norm continues to
dominate societal values); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Permissive Affirmative Action for the
Benefit of Blacks, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 379, 388 (arguing that society is predicated on
the ideal of equal opportunity, which is effectively denied to African-Americans who have
little chance of upward mobility). See also supra text accompanying notes 8-14.
58. The rate of African-American high school graduates entering college fell from 48%
in 1977 to a low of 36.5% in 1986, while the comparable white rate rose from 48% in
1973 to 57% in 1984. A COMMON DESTINY, supra note 7, at 338-39.
59. Statistics gathered in 1980 reveal that 12% of African-American women and 11%
of African-American men graduated from college, as compared to 22% of white women
and 25.5% of white men. Id. at 339-40.
60. In 1982, 32% of working white men were employed in professional or managerial
positions, compared to 20% of nonwhites, which was the same percentage of white men
so employed in 1950. Id. at 312. Thus, there is about a 30-year gap between the races in
this regard. Among women, there is a similar lag of about two decades in the proportion
of African-American women with professional or managerial jobs as compared to the
number of white women in such positions. Id. at 313-14. In 1960, approximately 18% of
white women were employed in these higher ranking jobs, while by 1982, the proportion
of nonwhite women in such positions had only reached 20%. Id. at 312-13. Furthermore,
African-Americans are overrepresented in occupations requiring low skill and paying low
wages. Id. at 312. "[B]lack women are twice as likely as white women to work in ser-
vice occupations" such as chambermaids, cleaners, or nurses* aides. Id. at 314.
61. Even earning a college degree does not insure economic parity, however. In 1984,
African-American male college graduates were earning only 74% of what similarly situated
white males were earning. Id. at 301. See also supra note 8.
62. Charles I. Lawrence I, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (arguing that Americans are the
products of a common history and culture that are permeated with racism and that they,
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racism have been virtually eradicated, 63 it is easy to conclude that
racism only exists as an aberration.' Prejudice, however, con-
tinues to operate on a subconscious level.65 African-Americans
have faced a history of oppression unparalleled by that of any
other racial or ethnic group in this country.' The immigrant ex-
perience of other ethnic groups is not comparable to the African-
American experience, which included not only slavery, but also
hundreds of years of official, lawful segregation and oppression.67
Racial parity cannot be achieved through the application of color-
blind principles in an atmosphere of racism.' Reduced to a sim-
therefore, subconsciously harbor racial discriminatory attitudes).
63. See Paul Delaney, Racial Climate Cooled Since '60s in Deep South, CLEVE. PLAN
DEALER, Mar. 15, 1992, at l-I (writing of his impressions as an African-American on a
journey through the modem-day Deep South, a trip he probably could not have made 30
years ago, and concluding that the Jim Crow social system has moved significantly to-
ward a more homogeneous southern society today).
64. See Crenshaw, supra note 56, at 1384 (acknowledging that while the formal bar-
riers against admitting African-Americans into mainstream society have been for the most
part eliminated, this change has been symbolically, rather than materially, significant);
Hazard, supra note 57, at 385 (stating that while most white Americans believe in the
principle of equality, they still consider African-Americans to be socially inferior and that
there are only a "handful" of self-acknowledged racists because it is socially and political-
ly unacceptable to discriminate on the basis of race).
65. See Crenshaw, supra note 56, at 1373-74 (arguing- that the white race has become
associated with normatively positive characteristics, while black images are resoundingly
negative); Lawrence, supra note 62, at 322 (stating that discriminatory behavior is caused
by subconscious racial motivations derived from a historical and cultural heritage in which
racism played a dominant role).
66. See, e.g., W. Haywood Bums, Law and Race in America, in THE PoLmIcs OF
LAW: A PROGREssIVE CRIIQUE 89, 89-95 (David Kaiys ed. 1982) (chronicling the sup-
pression of' African-Americans by operation of law from the early seventeenth century
through modem times); A COMMON DEsTINY, supra note 7, at 57 ("Black-white relations
in the United States have historically involved black subordination and exclusion from the
major social institutions of society.").
67. The most obvious example of legally sanctioned racism in United States history is
that the Constitution, when ratified in 1788, provided that a slave count only as three-
fifths of a person. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. It was not until 1868 that the Four-
teenth Amendment was adopted, which gave the former slaves the same status as other
citizens. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. See Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 395 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting) ("The
position of the Negro today in America is the tragic but inevitable consequence of centu-
ries of unequal treatment. Measured by any benchmark of comfort or achievement, mean-
ingful equality remains a distant dream for the Negro."). But see Antonin Scalia, The
Disease as Cure: 'In Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of
Race", 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 452 (drawing comparisons between the history of Afri-
can-Americans and the histories of the Irish and other ethnic groups immigrating to the
United States).
68. See Aleinikoff, supra note 56, at 1125 (arguing that to ignore the factor of race
denies the self-knowledge necessary to eradicate racism and achieve racial justice); Alan
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pie proposition - it is impossible to correct a problem if one
refuses to acknowledge that the problem exists.' For these rea-
sons, racial consciousness is essential, in the short run, to achieve a
fully integrated society. Justice Blackmun, in a seemingly contra-
dictory statement, perhaps put it best: "In order to get beyond
racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way.
And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them
differently."
70
Il1. THE AFRICAN-AMEICAN IMMERSION SCHOOL DOES NOT
RUN AFOUL OF THE SUPREME COURT'S SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
DECISIONS
In 1954, the Supreme Court in Brown I, denounced segrega-
tion in public education by declaring that "[s]eparate educational
facilities are inherently unequal."71 The separate but equal doctrine
of Plessy v. Ferguson,' which had prevailed for over half a cen-
tury, was resoundingly rejected.73 The Court held that segregation
deprived African-American school children of the equal protection
of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.74 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court did not merely rely on an assessment of the
segregated schools' tangible characteristics.75 The Court's decision
David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1066 (1978) (ar-
guing that a colorblind theory results in the denial of the legitimate, concrete demands of
those who historically have been the victims of racial discrimination); Donald E. Lively,
Color-Blindness and Social Blindness: Echoes from an Infamous Past, 33 How. LJ. 267,
283 (1990) (arguing that a colorblind standard advances form at the expense of substance
when race is excluded from consideration in a society which is disposed to make racial
distinctions).
69. See Crenshaw, supra note 56, at 1346-47 (stating that a purportedly colorblind so-
ciety that, in reality, is built on subordination cannot correct the subordination since it
fails to recognize it).
70. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407 (Blaclmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting) (arguing that, in order to achieve equality, it is necessary to treat differently
those who have been subordinated in the first instance).
71. Brown , 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
72. 163 U.S. 537, 550-52 (1896) (holding that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was to enforce political, not social, equality and that segregation on train cars ac-
cording to race was not unreasonable when viewed in the context of current customs).
73. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 492. See also Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 632-34 (1950) (finding that
substantially equal law school facilities for African-American students were not equal
when intangible factors, such as the reputations of the professors and the position and in-
fluence of the alumni, were considered); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S.
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was predicated on the importance of public educatione6 and the
detrimental, stigmatizing effect that segregation has on African-
American children.' Consideration of the intangible effects of
segregation was at the heart of the decision.7' In a second deci-
sion rendered in Brown, the Court ordered the dismantling of dual
school systems "with all deliberate speed."
79
Over the course of the last four decades, the Court has at-
tempted to refine and redefine what the Constitution requires in
order to achieve desegregated school systems. 0 In 1968, the
Court refused to countenance the use of a freedom-of-choice plan
as a viable vehicle to dismantle a segregated, dual school sys-
tem.8 Freedom-of-choice plans were not per se unconstitution-
al.' Rather, the particular plan under consideration had failed to
effectuate a transition to a unitary school system.83 Later, in 1971,
637, 640.42 (1950) (rejecting a state university plan to admit an African-American gradu-
ate student but assign him separate seats in the classroom, library, and cafeteria, because
such a restriction would impair his ability to engage in discussions and exchange views
with other students, which are integral parts of the educational process).
76. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 492-93 ("[Education] is a principal instrument in awakening
the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment.").
77. Id. at 494 ("To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.").
78. Id. at 492.
79. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1954) [hereinafter Brown H].
80. As recently as October 7, 1991, the Supreme Court heard oral argument on the
question of whether a school district that is operating under a court-supervised desegrega-
tion plan must continue to remedy the effects of demographic changes. Freeman v. Pitts,
112 S. Ct. 1430, 1430 (1992). On March 31, 1992, the Court issued its decision, holding
that a federal court may withdraw its supervision of a desegregation decree on an incre-
mental basis before total compliance has been achieved in all areas of school operations.
Id. at 1445-46. See also United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727, 2737 (1992) (holding
that public universities, in addition to public elementary and secondary schools, have an
affirmative duty to dismantle de jure segregated institutions).
81. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439-42 (1968) (striking down the plan
in an eastern Virginia county because, although the county was residentially integrated, it
maintained separate school systems for African-American and white children where stu-
dents were automatically reassigned to the school previously attended unless they applied
for admission to the other school).
82. Id at 439-40.
83. The Green Court reiterated that Brown 11 imposed an affirmative duty on school
boards to convert to a unitary school system, which eliminated racial discrimination -root
and branch." Id. at 437-38. It was incumbent on the school board "to come forward with
a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now." Id. at
439. Thirteen years after Brown 1H and three years after the implementation of the free-
dom-of-choice plan, the "black" school remained all African-American, and the "white"
school was attended by only 15% of the African-American students in the school system.
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the Court acknowledged a difference between de jure and de facto
segregation. t The evil prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment
is purposeful discrimination."5 In the first desegregation case to
come out of a northern state, the Court refined this principle by
holding that a constitutional violation will be found where students
are segregated by informal school board policies rather than by
force of law." Through these decisions, the Supreme Court af-
forded district courts broad remedial powers in cases where local
authorities fail to carry out their affirmative duty to desegregate.8 7
In 1974, in an apparent departure from these earlier decisions,
the Court refused to allow interdistrict relief absent a finding of
deliberate interdistrict segregation.88 Any remedy must be predicat-
ed on a constitutional violation. 9 On rehearing, the Court ap-
proved a plan that was limited to compensatory and remedial edu-
cational programs, 9° and ordered the state to pay half of the costs
Id. at 441.
84. Swarm v..Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1971). De facto
segregation is not the result of intentional acts by state or school authorities. Rather, it is
caused by social or economic factors. BLACK'S LAW DIcIONARY 416 (6th ed. 1990). De
jure segregation, on the other hand, is purposeful or is mandated by law. Id. at 425. See
also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) ("We emphasize that the
differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation ...
is purpose or intent to segregate.").
85. Swann, 402 U.S. at 15. "It is not always necessary for each school in the system
to reflect the racial composition of the whole, but single-race schools must be closely
scrutinized to determine if they result from purposeful discrimination by school authori-
ties." Id. at 25-26. Bizarre district lines and busing were held to be permissible tools for
desegregation and within the district court's remedial powers to provide equitable relief.
Id. at 27-3 1.
86. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 201-03. Although Denver, Colorado, did not operate a statutory
dual school system, the Park Hill section of the city had been deliberately segregated
through the use of gerrymandered attendance zones. Id. at 191-92, 198-200. A presump-
tion of the existence of a dual school system can be established by showing that school
authorities engaged in a systematic program of segregation within a "meaningful portion"
of the school system. Id. at 208. The burden is on the board of education to prove that
any other segregated schools within the system are not the result of intentionally segre-
gative actions. Id. at 209.
87. See Swam, 402 U.S. at 15 ("Mhe scope of a district court's equitable powers to
remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility ar inherent in equitable reme-
dies."); Brown I, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1954) ("[C]ourts will be guided by equitable princi-
ples [which are] characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a
facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs.").
88. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) [hereinafter Milliken 1]. Because of
residential segregation, the Court, in refusing to permit a remedy which encompassed the
entire Detroit metropolitan area, effectively destroyed any hopes that integration would be
achieved.
89. Id.
90. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 283 (1977) [hereinafter Milliken 13]. In addi-
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necessary to implement the plan.9'
The African-American Immersion School is not antithetical to
the decisions in Brown I and II, nor is it the first step on the
slippery slope toward resegregation. Instead, Brown must be viewed
within its historical context.' The Supreme Court was compelled
to order nationwide desegregation because, prior to 1954, a dual
public education system was maintained-with inferior facilities for
African-American children.93 In Brown I, the Court was concerned
with the broad effect that segregation had on these children. 9' Ac-
cording to the Court, even substantially equivalent facilities would
not legitimize segregation because segregation stigmatized African-
American children and instilled in them a sense of inferiority.9 5
Similarly, the African-American Immersion School is particularly
concerned with the effect that feelings of inferiority have on young
children. 96 However, because nationwide desegregation has not yet
been achieved, the African-American Immersion School takes a
different approach. The goal of the Immersion School is to incul-
cate in each child a positive, cultural self-image while meeting all
academic requirements. For this reason, the argument that racially
exclusive schools are unconstitutional under Brown I and II be-
cause of their debilitating effects is invalid in the case of the Afri-
can-American Immersion School.
The Court sought to eradicate the maintenance of a
compulsorily segregated school system.9' The African-American
tion to pupil reassignments, the plan contained an educational component consisting of en-
hanced reading programs, in-service training for teachers and administrators, guidance and
counseling programs and revised testing procedures. Id. at 275-76.
91. Id. at 288-89 (indicating that the plan goes no further than to require the state
officials responsible for the unconstitutional conduct to eliminate a de jure segregated
school system).
92. See DERRICK A. BELL, JL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW § 7.3 at 377,
1980 ("Brown has taken on a life of its own, with meaning and significance beyond its
facts and perhaps greater than its rationale.").
93. See Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.O (1954) (crediting the trial court finding that
African-American educational opportunities in Delaware were substantially inferior to those
available to white children); Morgan, supra note 33, at 104 (stating that in 1940, the per
capita amount spent to educate a white child in the South was twice that of each Afri-
can-American child).
94. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 492 (stating that the Court "must look instead to the effect
of segregation itself on public education.").
95. Id at 494.
96. See SAVAGE INEQUALrrIFs, supra note 3, at 99 (positing that children in the poor-
est schools understand that the system has written them off as poor investments and that
this understanding affects their motivation; and also finding that in the realm of education,
poverty and race are inextricably bound together).
97. See Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968)
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Immersion School is a special academy designed as a remedial
program for those African-American children whose needs are not
being met in the traditional academic environment. It is not intend-
ed to circumvent the Court's desegregation mandate. The African-
American Immersion School is neither a disguise for purposeful
discrimination nor will it create a segregated dual school system.
Nor is the Immersion School the type of freedom of choice plan
the U.S. Supreme Court found inadequate to remedy the segrega-
tion at issue in Green v. County School Bd of New Kent City.98
Here, students do not face the untenable situation in which integra-
tion will be achieved only if they seek admission to another
school. Presumably, desegregation has already been achieved and
the child is opting to attend the Immersion School in lieu of the
regular school.
The Immersion School is particularly useful in those metropol-
itan area school systems that are de facto segregated and beyond
the reach of an integration remedy as a result of demographic
changes." In its post-Brown decisions, the Supreme Court limited
the equitable powers of the federal courts to remedying instances
of de jure segregation."°° Constitutional violations are predicated
on intent; and because de facto segregation does not depend on a
showing of intent, it is remediless. However, efforts to remedy de
jure segregation through traditional methods of integration should
not be abandoned."°'
It is possible to read the Court's recent desegregation cases as
a tacit understanding that the benefits of desegregation are not
(finding that the pattern of separate African-American and white schools in New Kent
County "established under compulsion of state laws" is exactly what Brown I and I1 were
seeking to correct).
98. Id. at 438-39.
99. The Court in Milliken I found that, although the Detroit school system had long
been de jure segregated, a shift in residential housing patterns meant that integration could
now only be achieved through interdistrict busing. The Court concluded that interdistrict
relief was precluded absent a finding of an interdistrict constitutional violation. 418 U.S.
717, 745 (1974). Cf. Milliken IL 433 U.S. 267, 289-90 (1977) (requiring only that the
state take the necessary steps to dismantle state-imposed segregation).
100. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208-209 (1973) (emphasizing that
de jure segregation may be predicated on a "purpose or intent to segregate" by school
authorities); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1971) (the
objective is to see that no child is excluded due to race but courts cannot account for
other factors which may contribute to disproportionate racial concentrations in some
schools); cf. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 745 (interdistrict relief is only appropriate where the
segregation was directly caused by a de jure interdistrict constitutional violation).
101. See Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 744-45; Swann, 402 U.S. at 22-23.
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attainable in those areas where they are most needed - the urban
inner cities."°2 It matters little to the child subjected to segrega-
tion within a dual school system that the system is not purposeful-
ly maintained. 3 The special curriculum of *the African-American
Immersion School is an alternative remedy that is designed to en-
hance the educational experience of children in unavoidably segre-
gated situations.
Finally, the Court has acknowledged that school authorities
have broader powers than federal courts to formulate educational
policies."° For this reason, local school authorities should be free
to design a supplemental academic program tailored to the needs of
disadvantaged African-American children if such a program is
necessary to eradicate the effects of past segregation in educa-
tion. 05
IV. MID-LEVEL SCRUTINY IS THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF
REVIEW FOR RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS EMPLOYED FOR AN
EDUCATIONAL PURPOSE
A. The Supreme Court Currently Requires Strict Scrutiny
The African-American Immersion School is susceptible to
102. Bell, supra note 34, at 423-24 (stating that in the face of demographic shifts and
the discouraging lack of achievement by African-American children the Court may be
emphasizing education over integration and looking to other educational opportunities as
alternatives to desegregation).
103. See Lawrence, supra note 62, at 319 (arguing that the victims of racial inequality
are harmed regardless of the perpetrators' intentions, and asking, "Does the black child in
a segregated school experience less stigma and humiliation because the local school board
did not consciously set out to harm her? Are blacks less prisoners of the ghetto because
the decision that excludes them from an all-white neighborhood was made with property
values and not race in mind?").
104. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 16 (suggesting, for example, that the school board could
prescribe that the ratio of African-American to white students should reflect the population
for the whole district, while a court could not do so without finding a constitutional vio-
lation).
105. Segregation which is seemingly de facto may, in fact, be de jure. For instance, in
Milliken I, the record contained evidence of purposeful segregation by the Detroit school
authorities. The district court found, however, that shifts in residential housing patterns
precluded implementation of a traditional integration remedy. Milliken v. Bradley, 338 F.
Supp. 582 (ED. Mich. 1971). In essence, segregation which appeared to be de facto, re-
suiting from a change in the area's population, was, at one time, the result of de jure
segregation. There was actually a constitutional violation; it was just not readily apparent.
Because of demographic shifts, desegregation was infeasable. School boards should be free
to fashion an alternative remedy like the African-American Immersion School to counteract
situations like that in Detroit and to bolster the quality of education in a segregated envi-
ronment.
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challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because African-American students are treated differ-
ently from all other students." In a constitutional challenge, the
relevant question is what standard of review applies. The Supreme
Court has held that strict scrutiny is required in cases involving a
suspect class"°  or the deprivation of a fundamental right."°  Al-
though recognizing that education is "perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments," 1°9 the Court has consis-
tently refused to classify it as a fundamental right.110 It is likely
that the current Supreme Court would invoke strict scrutiny in the
case of the African-American Immersion School since the school
uses race-conscious admissions criteria and directly involves a
suspect class."'
106. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 356-59 (1978)
(Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, 31., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (rejecting the uses of both strict scrutiny and rational basis standards of
review); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973) (discussing
both strict scrutiny and rational basis standards of review).
107. The Supreme Court has defined a suspect class to include any group that is classi-
fied on the basis of race or national origin. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. (10
Otto) 303, 310 (1879) (striking down a law prohibiting African-American men from serv-
ing on juries and arguing that the equal protection clause affords special protection to
those who have been discriminated against because of their skin color); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (applying the "most rigid" scrutiny and uphold-
ing a statute that provided for the interment of Japanese-Americans during World War I).
Cf. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (holding that Texas school board which
failed to provide education for children of illegal immigrants is not discriminating against
a suspect class); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28-29 (holding that- distribution of wealth based
on property taxes is not an indicator of a suspect class).
108. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (striking down statutes requir-
ing a waiting period before obtaining welfare benefits because this requirement abridges
the right of interstate travel, a restriction that is impermissible unless necessary to promote
a compelling government interest); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670
(1966) (overturning statute requiring payment of a poll tax because the tax did not further
a compelling state interest, and holding that restrictions which invade the right to vote
must be closely scrutinized); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (overturning
a law requiring the sterilization of convicted felons because it interferes with the funda-
mental right to procreate and does not serve a compelling state interest).
109. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
110. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 34-35 (finding that the right to an education is neither
explicitly nor implicitly protected by the Constitution, although acknowledging that it is of
undisputed importance); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (stating that while education is not a
constitutional right, it is more than merely a benefit since it is necessary both to maintain
a democratic political system and to provide individuals with the basic tools to lead eco-
nomically productive lives).
111. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 (holding that the use of a burdensome racial
classification is only permitted where a compelling governmental interest is achieved by a
narrowly tailored statute).
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The Court originally applied a strict scrutiny analysis to racial
classifications to protect a minority group that had been foreclosed
from participation in the political process." 2 Justice Stone empha-
sized the importance of this procedural protection in his famous
footnote in United States v. Carolene Products,113 which first
gave credence to the notion that heightened scrutiny may be neces-
sary in order to protect those who are unable to protect them-
selves.1 4 Admittedly, the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment extend to all persons regardless of whether they possess any
distinguishing or immutable characteristic that results m a depriva-
tion of procedural due process. Modem equal protection jurispru-
dence, however, focuses particularly on the potential to exploit and
discriminate against those who are members of discrete and insular
minority groups
115
The strict scrutiny analysis consists of two prongs. First, the
government must establish a compelling state interest, and second,
the remedy must be narrowly tailored to further that state inter-
est." 6 Under the first part of the test, the Court has held that
race-conscious relief may only be employed to remedy discrimina-
tory practices that are identified with some specificity 17 Under
112. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 317 n.10 (1986) (Stevens, .,
dissenting).
113. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
114. "[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more search-
mg judicial inquiry." Id at 152 n.4.
115. See Neil K. Komeson, A Job For the Judges: The Judiciary and the Constitution
in a Massive and Complex Society, 86 MICH. L. REv. 657, 675 (1988) ("Significant judi-
cial concern about nustreatment of politically weak minorities surfaces in modem
equal protection law with its focus on well-defined racial, ethnic, and religious minon-
ties."); T. Alexander Aleiikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
LJ. 943, 1004 (1987) ("Much of modern due process and equal protection law can be
explained as the Court placing its finger on the scale on behalf of individuals and mmon-
ties.").
116. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274 (describing application of the two-prong test in the
context of racial classifications).
117. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989). Mere reliance on
good intentions or generalized assertions of racial discrmunation is not sufficient to estab-
lish a compelling state interest. Id. at 500; Weinberg v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648
n.16 (1975). Nor is it enough that statistical disparity exists between the number of con-
tracts awarded to minority firms as compared to the minority population of the entire city.
Croson, 488 U.S. at 501. However, an inference of discnminatory exclusion may arise
upon the establishment of a significant statistical disparity between the number of willing,
qualified miority subcontractors and the number actually hired. Id. at 503. The Court
emphatically stated that "[n]othimg we say today precludes a state or local entity from
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the second part of the analysis, the factors considered to determine
whether the remedy is narrowly tailored include the efficacy of al-
ternative remedies, the planned duration of the relief, and the effect
on innocent third parties. 18
Programs employing the benign racial criteria have not been
supported by a unanimous Supreme Court. Both past and present
Justices have argued that the Constitution demands racial neutrali-
ty.119 A majority of the Court has agreed, however, that strict
scrutiny applies to all racial classifications."' Writing for the plu-
taking action to rectify the effects of identified discrimination within its jurisdiction." Id.
at 509. See also Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274 CThis Court never has held that societal dis-
crimination alone is sufficient to justify a racial classification.").
118. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 187 (1987) (Powell, L, concurring).
The plan upheld in this case was designed to remedy the effects of discrimination in the
hiring of Alabama state troopers. The other two factors considered to determine whether
the plan was narrowly drawn were the percentage difference between the percentage mi-
nority workers to be employed as troopers and the total percentage in the work force, and
the availability of waiver provisions if it were impossible to meet the hiring plan.
119. See Metro Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 110 S.CL 2997, 3029
(1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (The FCC provides benefits to some members of our
society and denies benefits to others based on race or ethnicity. Except in the narrowest
of circumstances, the Constitution bars such racial classification . . . ."); Croson, 488 U.S.
at 518 (Kennedy, L, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The moral
imperative of racial neutrality is the driving force of the Equal Protection Clause."); Id. at
521 (Scalia, L, concurring in the judgment, quoting Justice Harlan's famous dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, L, dissenting) ("Our Constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens . . . .")); Regents of
the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (Powell, 3., plurality opinion)
("Preferring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is
discrimination for its own sake. This the Constitution forbids."); Id. at 416-18 (Stevens, 3.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (interpreting the Civil Rights
Act to embody the color-blind principles of the Constitution). See also Tamar Fruchtman,
Comment, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: Charring a Course Through the Su-
preme Court's Affirmative Action Decisions, 17 HASTINGs CoNsT. L.Q. 699, 715-20
(1990) (detailing the affirmative action views of the nine justices who decided the Croson
case).
120. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting.) ("[Tihe standard of review
under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or
benefited by a particular classification."); see also Wygant, 476 U.S. at 272-73 (plurality
agreeing that strict scrutiny should be applied to strike down collective bargaining agree-
ment between school board and teachers' union which required that lay-offs be by seruori-
ty, but at no time would the number of minority teachers laid-off exceed the number
employed). The Court uses mid-level scrutiny in those instances in which the preferential
treatment program has been enacted by the United States Congress because Congress has
the unique authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment by appropriate legislation. See
Metro Broadcasting, 110 S.CL at 3008-09 (upholding the FCC's use of minority prefer-
ence policies to issue broadcast licenses); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472, 492
(1980) (upholding the Public Works Employment Act, which required that 10% of federal
funds granted to local public works projects must be spent on services and supplies from
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rality in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 2' Justice
O'Connor emphasized that the language of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment provides that the equal protection of" the laws is not to be
denied to any person."n She reiterated Justice Powell's earlier
argument in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke1
that "[tihe guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing
when applied to one individual and something else when applied to
a person of another color."124
B. The Case for a Lesser Standard of Review
The Court, espousing platitudes such as that quoted above
from Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, seemingly makes its deci-
sions in a vacuum."ns A belief that the equal protection of the
laws is guaranteed to all persons regardless of color appeals to our
jurisprudential ideals of justice and equality but is not grounded in
historical reality. The laws of this country have never been applied
equally to persons of all races, regardless of their color."n In
view of existing discrimination, it is disingenuous to reject, as
minority-owned businesses); cf. Croson, 488 U.S. at 490 ("That Congress may identify
and redress the effects of society-wide discrimination does not mean that... the States
and their political subdivisions are free to decide that such remedies are appropriate.-).
121. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
122. Id.
123. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
124. Id at 289-90 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
125. See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elu-
sive Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 1729 (1989). Professor
Rosenfeld argues that Justice O'Connor's analysis in Croson was derived through the
process of decontextualization. Decontextualization occurs in a variety of ways, including
"lifting race relations out of their historical setting ... ; 'disaggregating" evidence so as
to produce the impression that tightly linked and mutually reinforcing facts actually stand
apart; and dealing with key conceptual constructs as though they were self-sustaining
when actually they are dependent on particular theoretical assumptions and on the exis-
tence of certain specified sets of facts." Id. at 1732. Given this process, strict scrutiny is
particularly inadequate in affirmative action cases. Id. Formalistic procedure tumps sub-
stance at the expense of justice. See also Dianne E. Dixon, The Dismantling of Affirma-
tive Action Programs: Evaluating City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 7 N.Y.L. SCs. J.
HUM. RTS. 35, 52 (1990) ("Justice O'Connor's implication that the white citizens of Rich-
mond have been so victimized by racial discrimination as to warrant suspect status and
require strict scrutiny of the Richmond set-aside plan is the epitome of ignorance and/or
sensitivity.").
.126. Justice Marshall points out that the frequently-invoked principle that the Constitu-
tion is color blind is extracted from the opinion of the lone dissenter in Plessy v.
Ferguson, where a "majority of the Court rejected the principle of colorblindness, and for
the next 60 years, from Pless-y to Brown v. Board of Education, ours was a Nation
where, by law, an individual could be given 'special' treatment based on the color of his
skin." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 401 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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offensive to the Constitution, the very programs designed to reme-
dy the resulting racial inequities because they make distinctions on
the basis of race. Equal protection of the laws does not always
mean equal treatment. The government should not sustain the ef-
fects of discrimination by failing to recognize that those differently
situated must be treated differently in order to achieve relative
parity among the majority. For example, requiring children to
pay a fare for bus transportation to school has a disparate impact
on those who cannot afford to pay and may deprive them of an
education.'" Exempting poor children from paying the fares so
that they are able to secure an education would support rather than
spurn the mandates of the Equal Protection Clause.
Moreover, the current majority of the Supreme Court does
violence to Justice Stone's analysis in Carolene Products..9 by
turning the Equal Protection Clause on its head and using it to
prevent the implementation of race-conscious programs that are
designed to remedy a history of societal discrimination. It is impor-
tant to remember that the purpose of remedial race-conscious pro-
grams is to benefit, not burden, the minority.13 Any burden that
is created by these programs falls on the shoulders of the majority
and is effectively distributed among those who are best able to
bear it, those who can protect themselves by influencing the politi-
cal process.131 Where a minority is not subject to invidious dis-
crimination, it makes little sense to require the application of the
127. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971) (upholding varying ballot access
requirements for major and minor political parties by reasoning that "sometimes the gross-
est discrimination can lie in treating things that are different as though they were exactly
alike"). See also MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 15 (1991). Professor
Minow posits that this situation is the dilemma of difference. Although treating people
differently emphasizes difference and tends to stigmatize, treating all individuals alike
displays an insensitivity to difference and is also likely to stigmatize. She argues for a
shift in societal perceptions of difference from one of distinctions between people to one
of relationships between individuals.
128. LAURENCE H. TRBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-1, at 1438-39 (2d ed.
1988).
129. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (implying that
"discrete and insular minorities" may be deserving of additional protection).
130. Benign racial classifications are those which employ race-conscious criteria to reme-
dy past discrimination against the classified group. See TRINE, supra note 128, at 1524
("Racial antagonism, of course, is hardly the motive of today's minority set-aside pro-
grams.").
131. The Supreme Court has recognized and tolerated the fact that a policy of eradi-
cating racial discrimination may necessitate that innocent persons bear some of the burden.
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1986).
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rigid standard of strict scrutiny.
The African-American Immersion School should be reviewed
under a standard of mid-level scrutiny which requires that a pro-
gram using race-conscious criteria further a substantial state inter-
est." The Supreme Court's adoption of a strict scrutiny standard
for benign racial classifications has an anomalous result. The same
Constitution that for much of the past 200 years permitted racial
discrimination is now interpreted to prohibit a remedy designed to
redress the effects of that discrimination.'33 A lesser standard of
review will avoid the "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact" trap of
strict scrutiny. 34
In Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 35 Justices
Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun and White urged that mid-level scru-
tiny should be the standard of review in cases of benign racial
classifications.1" The Justices rejected low-level, rational basis
132. Mid-level scrtiny would require that the racial classification serve an important
governmental objective and be substantially related to the achievement of that objective.
Id. at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blacknun, H1., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
133. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387 (1978) (Marshall,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). "[Had the Court been will-
ing in 1896, in Plessy v. Ferguson, to hold that the Equal Protection Clause forbids dif-
ferences in treatment based on race, we would not be faced with this dilemma in 1978."
Id. at 401.
134. Gerald R. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L REV. 1, 8 (1972). Application of the standard of strict scrutiny almost always
results in the regulation or classification being struck down as unconstitutional. For this
reason, programs enacted for the general purposes of remedying societal discrimination and
promoting integration will be overturned. Using a test of strict scrutiny, the Court has,
since 1945, struck down all laws that have had the effect of burdening racial minorities.
RONALD D. ROTUNDA AND JOHN E. NowAc, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18.5,
at 61 (2d ed. 1992). There are two notable exceptions to this general rule. First, prison
officials may separate inmates along racial lines if such action is necessary to ease racial
tension or quell rioting. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333-34 (1968) (per curiam).
Second, governmental agencies may use racial information when gathering data and keep-
ing statistical records as long as a legitimate governmental purpose requires keeping re-
cords in this manner. See Hamm v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156,
158, aff'd sub nom Tancil v..Woods, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (upholding statute requiring
inclusion of race on divorce decrees; invalidating statutes requiring the keeping of race-
separate statistics on voting, tax, and property records).
135. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The plaintiff, Bakke, was a white male whose application for
admission to the University of California at Davis Medical School was rejected for two
consecutive years. Plaintiff complained that the University's minority admissions program
impermissibly discriminated against him on the basis of his race. 438 U.S. at 272-78
(Powell, L, plurality opinion).
136. A majority of the Court did not agree as to the appropriate level of scrutiny to be
applied in "reverse discrimination" cases.
19931
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review since benign racial classifications carry with them the risk
of invidious discrimination. They argued that a racial classification
should be permissible as long as it serves an important governmen-
tal objective and does not stigmatize or burden any single
group.1 37 A mid-level standard of review is appealing because it
both permits affirmative action programs to survive constitutional
challenges and safeguards against the possibility that the classifica-
tion will be used to discriminate against the powerless and the
under-represented. A history of societal discrimination is reason
enough to afford a remedy by means of race-conscious programs in
these situations. 13
Justices Marshall, Brennan, White, and Blackmnun concluded
that the University of California's race-conscious admissions pro-
gram passed the two prong test 139 applicable under mid-level
scrutiny."4 First, the racial classification served the important
governmental interest of remedying the effects of past societal
discrimination that impeded minority access to medical school.14 '
Second, the program did not impermissibly burden anyone or stig-
matize the plaintiff. 42 Bakke was not destined to suffer feelings
of inferiority and inequality of treatment as a result of the rejection
of his application in the same way that African-American children
suffered from the effects of segregation.143 He would not be rele-
gated to the status of a second-class citizen for life because of the
color of his skin. 44 The Justices also found that the medical
school's admission program did not stigmatize the successful mi-
nority candidates. They reasoned that, once admitted, all students
must satisfy the same degree requirements to graduate. 45
Mid-level scrutiny is particularly appropriate in the realm of
137. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 361-62 (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blaclranun, H3., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
138. Cf. Lawrence, supra note 61, at 323 (arguing that requiring proof of intentional
discrimination ignores the reality of how racism has been internalized to become part of
our collective unconscious).
139. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
140. Id. at 379.
141. Id. at 362.
142. Id. at 374-75.
143. See Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (arguing that the harm suffered by the Af-
rican-American students included a perception of inferiority as to their place in society).
144. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 375 (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blacknun, JL, concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
145. Id. at 376.
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education. Rather than demand that the school board show specific,
past discrimination in order to justify the use of a race-conscious
remedial program, 146 the appropriate test would inquire whether
the school board's "action advances the public interest in educating
children for the future." 47 The Court has traditionally refused to
meddle in the pedagogical affairs of local school systems absent
the violation of a constitutional right.'" As long as the racial
classification does not invidiously discriminate against a minority
group, the school board is entitled to deference in the implementa-
tion and management of its academic programs. 149  Subjecting
school board decisions to mid-level scrutiny will adequately protect
the interests of African-American children.
Another rationale for adopting mid-level scrutiny as the stan-
dard of review for race conscious programs is that a lower level of
scrutiny encourages the development of progressive public policies.
A majority of the Supreme Court has now adopted the myopic
approach of allowing the use of race conscious programs only
when establishing remedies for specific, identifiable incidents of
discrimination.!"° Requiring particularized remediation precludes
political subdivisions from engaging in social planning that aims to
effect a better society in the future. The Court has, in other con-
146. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989) (holding that
a compelling government interest will be served only where there is a particularized
showing of discrimination).
147. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that a finding of past discrimination is not necessary to support the use of
race-conscious criteria to hire school teachers).
148. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (upholding the
right of educators to exercise editorial control over school-sponsored newspapers where
censorship is reasonably related to educational goals); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,
478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (indicating that a school district has the authority to prohibit
students' use of offensively lewd and vulgar speech during assembly because such behav-
ior by students undermines the school's educational mission); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312
("The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education includes the
selection of its student body."); Tinker v. Des Moines Independ. Sch. Sys., 393 U.S. 503,
514 (1969) (finding that school officials are not permitted to prevent students from wear-
ing black armbands in political protest unless there was a substantial disruption of school
activities because to do so would infringe students' free speech rights).
149. Cf. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 637
(1991) (stating that local control over education allows for innovation and the creation of
school programs to fit local needs); Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717, 742 (1974) (acknowledging
the importance of local participation in and control over the educational needs of its com-
munity); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1973) (recogniz-
ing that local control over school systems encourages "experimentation, innovation, and a
healthy competition for educational excellence").
150. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 492.
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texts, recognized the importance of allowing some discretion in
dealing with social and economic problems.1
51
Current social problems that are the consequences of hundreds
of years of legalized racial discrimination are not amenable to
traditional modes of constitutional analysis.' 52 The Court's con-
cern that "the mutability of a constitutional principle, based upon
shifting political and social judgments, undermines the chances for
consistent application of the Constitution from one generation to
the next"153 has merit. The Court is also correct in presupposing
that there are instances in which benign racial classifications are
"in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or
simple racial politics."'54  The reconciliation of these legitimate
concerns, however, does not demand the application of strict scruti-
ny analysis to all race-conscious programs, a scheme that effective-
ly overturns ostensibly valid programs designed to eradicate soci-
etal inequities. Mid-level scrutiny, if properly applied, will ade-
quately ensure that affirmative action programs have neither an evil
purpose nor an adverse effect.'55
The African-American Immersion School, if analyzed under a
mid-level standard of review, will survive a constitutional chal-
lenge. The school serves an important governmental interest and
does not impermissibly disadvantage anyone. First, the articulated
purpose of remedying the effects of pervasive historical and soci-
etal discrimination is sufficiently important to justify using race
conscious admissions criteria. Certainly, the education of the
nation's children is a substantial government interest, particularly
given the strong indications that African-Americans are receiving
inferior educations and, consequently, are less able to participate
151. Cf. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491 (1980) (quoting New State Ice Co.
v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)) ("To stay experimenta-
tion in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experi-
ment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation.").
152. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 358 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., concur-
ring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (the fact that so-called reverse dis-
crimination cases do not fit into the customary analytic framework for race cases does not
mean that a loose rational-basis standard of review should be applied).
153. Id. at 299 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
154. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion, Part HI-A).
155. The significant risk that benign racial classifications will be misused demands that
an important and articulated purpose be shown to justify their use. Any regulation that
stigmatizes or imposes the burden of the program on those least represented in the politi-
cal process will be struck down. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 361 (Brennan, White, Marshall and
Blaclamun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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effectively in mainstream society." The primary goal of the Im-
mersion School is to develop the hearts and minds of African-
American children so that they may become independent, partici-
pating members of society.
Second, the African-American Immersion School burdens no
one. It does not burden white children who are not denied a quali-
ty education but are merely denied admission to the Immersion
School. Moreover, white students are not denied the right to an
education among a diverse student population. The African-Ameri-
can Immersion School admits its students on a voluntary basis and
it is unlikely that every African-American child will opt to attend
the segregated school. Any minimal impact on the white students is
more than offset by the benefits of the race conscious measure to
the African-American community and society overall.'"
The Immersion School will not have the effect of stigmatizing
its students. On the contrary, the school is intended to engender the
development of positive images of culture and self so that the
students will have the confidence and ability to become productive
members of society. It is plausible to conjecture that, in time, the
Immersion Schools will develop reputations as strong academic
institutions. The ultimate effect will be to eliminate African-
Americans' feelings of inferiority.
V. THE SUPREmE COURT'S DECISIONS ON THE USE OF RACIAL
CLASSIFICATIONS Do NOT PRECLUDE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
AFRICAN-AMERICAN IMMERSION SCHOOL
Even if mid-level scrutiny is rejected as the standard of review
for cases involving race-conscious educational programs, the Afri-
can-American Immersion School would survive an equal protection
challenge under the current strict scrutiny test for racial classifica-
tions. 58 In Croson, a majority of the Court agreed for the first
156. See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
157. Cf Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280-82 (1986) (plurality opin-
ion). Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, argues that
remedial programs that burden innocent parties may be permissible if they are properly
tailored to cure the effects of prior discrimination. For example, a distinction can be made-
between cases involving valid hiring goals and those requiring race-based layoffs. In the
case of hiring goals, the burden on innocent individuals is diffused throughout society
generally. Conversely, layoffs directly harm particular individuals. There is a difference be-
tween the denial of potential employment and the loss of current income.
158. Cf. Joint Statement, Constitutional Scholars' Statement on Affirmative Action After
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 98 YALE LJ. 1711, 1712 (1989). In the aftermath
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time that strict scrutiny is the standard of review for race conscious
programs 59 The Court invalidated the City of Richmond's plan,
which required that thirty percent of every dollar in city-awarded
construction contracts go to minority business enterprises."6  It
mattered little to a plurality of the Court that the resulting benefit
enriched African-Americans while the burden fell on white per-
sons.16 According to the Court, a racial classification must (1)
further a compelling state interest and (2) be narrowly drawn to
promote that interest.1 62 The Court emphatically denounced the
city's goal of remedying past societal discrimination. It claimed
that this goal was not compelling enough to justify the use of a
racial classification. 163
While the Court emphasized that "simple legislative assurances
of good intention [would not] suffice" to establish a compelling
state interest,1" it did not prohibit the use of all racial classifica-
tions. The plurality would permit remediation when minority con-
tractors are systematically excluded from subcontracting opportuni-
ties. 65 For example, an inference of systematic discriminatory ex-
clusion may arise when there is a significant statistical disparity
between the number of qualified minority contractors available to
perform and those actually engaged in the performance of such
contracts."' The plurality agreed that "[i]n the extreme case,
some form of narrowly tailored racial preference might be neces-
of the Croson decision, 30 law school deans and professors met in Boston, Massachusetts,
to discuss the future of race conscious remedial programs. They concluded that "[t]he Su-
preme Court has insisted that affirmative action programs be carefully designed - not
dismantled. A call for fairness and flexibility in affirmative action programs should never
be equated with a call for retrenchment and retreaL" Contra Charles Fried, Comment,
Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: A Response to the
Scholars' Statement, 99 YALE LL 155, 158 (1989) (arguing that "the Court's recent juris-
prudence makes it risky, to say the least, for local authorities to rely on the scholars'
confident reassurance that the conditions for justifying racial preferences in this regard are
not now quite rigorous").
159. This majority consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, White,
Kennedy and Scalia. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 475 (1989).
160. Id. at 511.
161. Id. at 494 (plurality opinion, Part 11I-A).
162. Id. at 498-506.
163. Id. at 504-505 (the plan failed because the city failed to identify specific incidents
of racial discrimination within the construction industry in Richmond, Virginia, and thus
did not demonstrate a compelling government interest).
164. Id. at 500.
165. Id. at 509 (plurality opinion, Part V).
166. ld
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sary to break down patterns of deliberate exclusion.""6 7
A state has a compelling interest in remedying violations of
state constitutional guarantees."' For example, several states have
a constitutional guarantee providing for a minimum education.169
Thus, once a state makes a finding that the under-education of
African-American children amounts to a violation of its constitu-
tion, its compelling interest in rectifying this wrong allows imple-
mentation of the Immersion School, even under a strict reading of
Croson. As a result of this under-education many African-Ameri-
cans are unable to sustain a minimal level of subsistence compa-
rable to that of most white Americans. 170 The African-American
Immersion School does not pretend to solve all of society's race-
related problems. In the face of these problems, many of which re-
sult from substandard education, 171 the African-American Immer-
sion School aims to provide previously neglected children with a
solid education and to inculcate positive ethnocentric values and
favorable self-images. In this way African-Americans will possess
the tools necessary to advance in a society controlled predominant-
ly by white institutions."
The inference of discrimination found in the varying amounts
of money allocated per pupil in urban schools, which are attended
primarily by African-Americans, and suburban schools, which are
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Luetkomeyer v. Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. Mo. 1973), aff'd 419
U.S. 888 (1974) (holding that Missouri's interest in the separation of church and state is
an "interest of the highest order.").
169. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (NJ. 1990) (holding unconstitutional a
state statutory school-financing system that led to wide funding disparities between rich
and poor school districts); Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.
1989) (school funding system held violative of Texas state constitution's provision for "ef-
ficient" public school system).
170. See Aleinikoff, supra note 55, at 1065-66 (ifi]n almost every important category,
blacks as a group are worse off than whites"); see also supra notes 7-14 and accompany-
ing text.
171. Burt Newbome, Notes for the Restatement (First) of the Law of Affirmative Action,
64 TUL. L. REV. 1543, 1545 (1990) (arguing that the massive, government-sanctioned
discrimination in education prevents African-Americans from competing for the rewards of
a free market society on the basis of their talent).
172. In an article discussing affirmative action in the context of higher education, the
dean of the graduate school at Rutgers University made an appealing argunent. a race-
based admissions program is "a meritorious plan against obscene waste. We need to re-
think it so that it can better bind and reweave the present. If we fail to do so, we will
have pushed it further astray, to be devoured by its enemies or to atrophy on a diet of
inertia." Catharine R. Stimpson, It Is 2me to Rethink Affirmative Action, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDTC., Jan. 15, 1992, at A48.
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attended by white children, provides a compelling state interesL173
The plurality in Croson emphasized in dicta that it would have
considered evidence of a significant disparity between the number
of minority contractors willing and able to perform a service and
the number actually engaged in the performance of such subcon-
tracts as an inference of discriminatory exclusion. 174 Similarly, in
the realm of education, the sizable differences in funding that fall
along racial lines imply the existence of racially motivated discrim-
ination. New York City, for example, spent an average of $7299
per student in the 1989-90 academic year to educate its students,
while Great Neck, Long Island spent approximately $15,000 for
each child. Under the strictures of Croson, the inference created by
such statistics is enough to establish a compelling state interest that
justifies race conscious remediation.
After examining the language of the statute being challenged
in Croson, the Supreme Court concluded that the City of
Richmond's asserted interest in remedying past discrimination in
the construction industry was disingenuous. The Court disapproved
of the overinclusive nature of the statute, 7 which defined minor-
ity group members as "[c]itizens of the United States who are
Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or
Aleuts."176 Writing for the majority in Croson, Justice O'Connor
argued that the seemingly indiscriminate wording of the statute
"strongly impugn[ed] the city's claim of remedial motivation." "
173. SAVAGE INEQUALr1ES, supra note 3, at 237. Similar funding gaps are found in
other areas of the country. It costs the City of Chicago $5265 to educate each of its
children while Niles Township High School, a suburban Chicago township, allocates
$9371 per pupil. Camden, New Jersey spends $3538 on each child while Princeton spends
$7725. Id. at 236. These funding disparities correspond to racial differences. According to
the 1990 population census, 52.3% of New York City residents are white and 28.7% are
African-American. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF
POPULATION, General Population Characteristics, Table 6. In Great Neck, 90.8% of the
residents are white; 4.8% are African-American. Id. In Chicago, 45.4% of the residents
are white; 39.1% are African-American. Id. In Niles Township, the percentages are 91.6%
and 0.4% respectively. Id. Similarly, 19.0% of Camden residents are white and 56.4% are
African-American, while 84.1% of Princeton residents are white and 6.9% are African-
American. Id. Generally, those schools receiving the least funding are in cities with large
African-American populations. It is not unusual for children in inner-city schools to be
subjected to conditions that would not be tolerated by suburban parents, such as over-
crowding, sharing of textbooks, leaking roofs, decrepit structures, and closets serving as
classrooms. SAVAGE INEQUALIrIES, supra note 3, at 85-86, 106, 114. .
174. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989).
175. Id. at 506.
176. Id. at 478.
177. Id. at 506; see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 284 n.13
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The African-American Immersion School does not suffer from
a similar defect since it is limited in scope. It is designed to reme-
dy the effects of discrimination which have been perpetrated
against African-American citizens. The school is available to Afri-
can-American students on a voluntary basis and is not concerned
with minority students of other origins. The African-American
Immersion School is seemingly vulnerable to the criticism that it is
a reaction to general societal discrimination rather than particular-
ized incidents of discrimination within the control of the school
board. However, the members of the classified group have suffered
for almost 375 years as the victims of discrimination.17 African-
Americans today continue to suffer the effects of this history of
discrimination. 79 The Immersion School is an attempt to achieve
social parity.
Justice Stevens' concurrence in Croson suggested two ,possible
reasons for treating societal classes differently."s Like the majori-
ty, he would permit disparate treatment of a particular group upon
a showing that the members of that group have been the victims of
unfair treatment in the past."" Justice Stevens went a step fur-
ther, however, and stated that he would also allow race conscious
relief where members of a particular group are precluded from
effectively competing in the future as a result of their disadvan-
tages.182 He stated that "the Constitution requires us to evaluate
our policy decisions - including those that govern the relation-
ships among different racial and ethnic groups - primarily by
studying their probable impact on the future."1
83
The African-American Immersion School's impact on the
future of its students as well as society will be positive."' As a
(1986) (The haphazard inclusion of a diverse variety of racial groups "further illustrates
the undifferentiated nature of the plan.").
178. History records 1621 as the year the African slave trade began in this country with
the formation of the Dutch West Indies Company. This company imported slaves to serve
on Hudson Valley Farms. Slaves were imported into Connecticut beginning in 1629,
Maryland and Massachusetts in 1634 and New York in 1637. THm NEGRO AUMANAc,
supra note 8, at 2.
179. See supra notes 7-23 and accompanying text.
180. Croson, 488 U.S. at 517 (Stevens, L, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
181. Id. (citing Justice Stevens' opinion in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 553
(1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
182. Id. at 734.
183. Id. at 511 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
184. See lean Merl and Eric Harrison, Schools Reach Out to Blacks; Efforts are Under-
way to Reverse the Discouraging Educational Track Record of Many Black Males. Role
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result of the emphasis on academic rigor and discipline, Immersion
Schools will likely develop reputations as exemplary educational
institutions with proven records in academic achievement and the
development of citizenship skills akin to that provided at private
academies. Therefore, students will benefit by graduating from
institutions of strong repute in addition to receiving solid academic
backgrounds. Thus, the argument that the Immersion School's
resegregation will further stigmatize African-American youths is
without merit." s The Immersion School does not purport to solve
all of society's failings in the realm of race relations. While it has
absolutely no control over the barriers that students will confront
as they try to enter a world dominated primarily by white institu-
tions, it will provide its graduates with tools that will better able
them to overcome these barriers. The African-American Immersion
School meets the compelling state interest standard as it is defined
in Justice Stevens' future impact doctrine. However, it is unlikely
that this standard would garner enough support on the current
Court to gain a majority.
The second prong of the strict scrutiny analysis demands that
any program that uses racial criteria be narrowly tailored to remedy
past discrimination. The Croson Court looked to the factors enu-
merated by Justice Brennan in United States v. Paradise" to
make this determination. 7 In the context of a challenge to an
affirmative action hiring and promotion plan, the relevant factors
were: (1) the efficacy of alternative remedies;'88 (2) the planned
duration of the remedy; 89 (3) the statistical relationship between
the number of minorities employed and the number in the relevant
population or work force; 9 (4) the availability of waiver provi-
sions if the plan cannot be met;' 91 and (5) the remedy's effect
upon innocent third parties."
Mddels Have Been HelpfuL One Experiment Inspires Both Hope and Fury, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 28, 1990, at Al (reporting that attendance, behavior, self-esteem, and academic
achievement among the students have improved).
185. See Traub, supra note 26 (arguing that resistance to resegregation is wasted since,
as the result of demographic shifts, millions of African-American children do not enjoy
the benefits of desegregation).
186. 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987).
187. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (majority opinion).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 510.
190. Id. at 501.
191. Id. at 508.
192. Id. at 510.
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Factors three and four have no bearing on the African-Ameri-
can Immersion School."9 Insofar as the efficacy of alternative
remedies is concerned, integration of the schools is not a panacea
and desegregation will not singlehandedly solve the problem of
racial separation in American schools. In those school systems in
which de jure segregation exists, the desegregation mandate of
Brown I and II should be the foremost remedy for any constitu-
tional violation. However, in school systems where there is evi-
dence of de jure segregation and yet no desegregation remedy is
available due to residential shifts, the African-American Immersion
School is well within a court's equity jurisdiction."9 Where de
facto segregation exists, the African-American Immersion School is
a viable vehicle by which local authorities can eliminate the stig-
matizing effects of segregation. Thus, the Immersion School is nar-
rowly tailored as the most effective program to remedy past dis-
crimination in specific factual circumstances.
The African-American Immersion School should be an experi-
mental program designed to operate for an initial period of five
years. The program would then be renewable for additional ten-
year periods by agreement of the school board if the board's mem-
bers decide that the school positively influences the students. Be-
yond the first five year period, the school would operate totally at
the discretion of its administrators,1 satisfying the second factor
of the Paradise analysis.
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, placed particular
importance on the fifth factor of the Pardise analysis, consideration
of the burden on innocent parties.' 96 He found that the burden
imposed by a hiring and promotion plan, unlike that imposed by a
layoff plan, was relatively diffused."9 The plan did not force the
burden on a single individual and did not seriously disrupt the
193. In Paradise, the state police department was not operating under a voluntary
remediation program. Instead, it was seeking modification of a court order requiring that
minorities be given preferential treatment in hiring and promotion practices. United States
v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 153 (1987) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
194. Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion in Croson, approved of strict scrutiny
because it only permitted the use of racial classifications as a last resort. Croson, 488
U.S. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). For those
African-American school children receiving an inferior education in a segregated
enviroment, the Immersion School is the last resort.
195. This is one of a number of factors considered by the Court in judging a hiring
plan to be narrowly tailored. Paradise 480 U.S. at 179.
196. See id. at 188-89 (Powell, J., concurring).
197. Id.
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lives of innocent parties.198 Similarly, the Immersion School does
not burden or disrupt the life of any single person. The creation of
the Immersion School does not seriously disrupt the lives of chil-
dren who are not African-American and distributes the burden, if
any, evenly among them. These children will continue to receive
an education in a diverse environment that includes minority stu-
dents, except for those African-Americans who choose to attend the
Immersion School. For these reasons, the Immersion School is a
narrowly tailored remedy under the Court's five factor analysis.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite over 35 years of desegregation mandates, segregation
and its effects continue to plague American education. In a segre-
gated Boston classroom in 1964, a little girl cried upon hearing
Langston Hughes' words, "[w]hat happens to a dream deferred? /
Does it dry up / like a raisin in the sun?" 1 In 1989, a teenager
at East St. Louis High School, with wisdom beyond her years,
tacitly understood, though she could not articulate why, that deseg-
regation would not affect the lives of the students in the affluent,
predominately white suburb of Fairview Heights across the river. If
busing were ordered, she knew that the buses crossing the river
into East St. Louis would be empty.200 The African-American
Immersion School is a worthy experiment whose time has come.
The school and its innovators should be given the opportunity to
make a difference in the lives of so many of the nation's children.
ROBERTA L. STEELE
198. Id. at 189.
199. SAVAGE INEQUALITIES, supra note 3, at 1-2; LANGSTON HUGHES, Harlem, in SE-
LECTED POEMS OF LANGSTON HUGHES 268 (1975).
200. SAVAGE INEQUALrIES, supra note 3, at 31-32.
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